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Introduction
The nature of health care as a social and a private good means that it is the
subject of intense regulation in most countries (Saltman et al. 2002). Over time,
each society has established an array of institutions, laws and rules to regulate
the practices of health care workers in the stated interest of protecting the public
and ensuring high-quality services. Recently, in the wake of high-profile cases of
poor performance and professional misconduct, health policy-makers have
increasingly felt the need to strengthen or reform the regulatory mechanisms
for the health professions. Yet overregulation can be as great a problem as
underregulation, as it inhibits innovation and demotivates professionals.
Regulation is complex, requiring health policy-makers to balance a number of
considerations related to the social, political and economic context of health
care. This chapter sets out a framework for the analysis of approaches to profes-
sional regulation and applies it to the experience of reforming the regulation of
doctors in a number of European countries.1 The chapter aims to identify recent
trends in regulatory reforms in order to increase understanding of what consti-
tutes appropriate regulation – that is, how to ensure high standards and effective
accountability without adverse effects on efficiency. It is hoped that it will assist
policy-makers and regulators to select, from the vast range of options available,
an optimal mix of regulatory instruments.2
Primarily, the chapter considers regulatory provisions that aim to protect the
public from harm and to foster the provision of high-quality and efficient care.
It does not deal directly with the regulation of supply, education and labour
relations, as these issues are examined in more detail elsewhere (Chapters 3, 4, 5
and 9). The following section sets out a theoretical framework for examining
professional regulation. A number of case studies are presented, and these form
the basis for an assessment of the general direction of regulatory reforms and
the key strategies that have been used in Europe. These cases suggest that there
is a shift towards greater political accountability and micro-regulation. Recent
reforms go beyond traditional models based on professional self-regulation.
They suggest a continual expansion of regulatory practices, a larger repertoire of
policy instruments and increased oversight by external actors.
A framework for analysing regulation in the health labour
market
Occupational regulation in health care is nothing new and has been traced back
to the earliest records of the healing professions. The legal code of Hammurabi,
established in about 2000 bc in Mesopotamia, created a drastic remedy for
malpractice: amputation of the surgeon’s hand (Hogan 1979; Merry and Crago
2001). Here the primary public purpose of state intervention was to prevent
harm from dangerous or unqualified medical practice. From another perspec-
tive the Hippocratic oath, originating in Greece in the fifth century bc, was
based on the view that medicine is above all a vocation (Jacob 1999). Doctors
operate within an ethical tradition and are subject to self-imposed codes of
conduct accepted voluntarily by the professions. Regulation of the health care
workforce within contemporary societies has evolved to become a complex and
polymorphic system with multiple objectives. However, the main dilemmas
remain: who should regulate, and how?
Degree of state intervention
Regulation, by its very nature, requires a source of regulatory authority. How-
ever, the most appropriate locus of this authority remains the subject of intense
debate in the health sector. Consequently professional bodies’ degrees of
involvement in the regulatory system and the role of external actors, such as
state institutions, vary. The extent to which the state intervenes in the practice
of medicine can be seen as a continuum from complete professional autonomy
and self-determination to direct state control (Figure 10.1). In reality, the state
may intervene more in certain aspects of regulation, such as remuneration, than
Figure 10.1 Degree of state intervention in professional regulation.
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in others, such as entry criteria, though this has been shown to vary between
countries (Moran and Wood 1993).
The view that regulation should be the sole responsibility of the professional
group concerned has long been a fundamental aspect of professionalism in
medicine (Freidson 1970; Rottenberg 1980). Self-regulation of health profes-
sionals is justified on the basis that their services are experience goods and
therefore they themselves have more knowledge about the quality and risks of
receiving health services than do public authorities and consumers. Because of
this information asymmetry between those who practise and those who seek to
regulate, professional organizations argue that they are in the best position to
ensure quality and prevent public harm.
Another argument in favour of self-regulation is that it is more efficient.
Information to set, monitor and enforce standards is more easily acquired. The
self-regulators’ level of understanding of the professions gives them the flexibility
to adapt to changes in practice and make voluntary compliance more likely
(Baldwin and Cave 1999). Furthermore, the costs are lower than those that
might arise from a more formal legalistic mechanism, and are borne by the pro-
fession instead of the government (or taxpayer). Yet the case for self-regulation
is not accepted universally.
Economists in particular are wary about the virtues of self-regulation
(Chapter 8), and emphasize self-regulation’s economic benefits for the profes-
sions. As early as 1770, Adam Smith highlighted the ability of crafts to lengthen
apprenticeship programmes and limit the number of apprentices per master,
thus restraining free competition and ensuring higher earnings for persons in
those occupations. Codes of ethics and standards of practice that are designed to
ensure that professionals have appropriate competencies, deliver a high-quality
service and continue to develop their skills and knowledge are seen as barriers
to entry, as they are used to regulate the numbers of practitioners and the
conditions under which they can participate in the market (Smith 1970).
More recently, analysis of regulation has observed regulatory capture,
whereby the regulator comes to serve the interests of the group regulated rather
than those of the public (Gellhorn 1956, 1976; Friedman 1962). Capture theory
predicts that health professionals will structure regulations to keep out competi-
tion and thereby increase their incomes (Moore 1961; Coase 1974; Posner 1974).
Such views are also consistent with the rent-seeking interpretation of interest
group behaviour in the public choice literature and the economic theory of
regulation (Stigler 1971; Becker 1983; Peltzman 1989; Lowenberg and Tinnin
1992; Zhou 1993). These posit that the demand for regulation comes primarily
from practitioners looking for protective regulation, such as regulated prices
and barriers to entry to the market. As such, regulation originates where supplier
interest groups are concentrated and well-organized so that they can lobby
effectively to influence the level and content of regulation to their benefit.
However, such control may result in regulatory failures, including the creation
of monopolies, a scarcity of certain necessary services and inefficiency.
Thus, where regulation is internalized fully by professionals, there is a danger
that it will not serve the public interest. External forms of regulation are thus
promoted as a means to achieve a better balance between professional and pub-
lic interests, combat provider monopolies, avoid unjustified restrictions on
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competition and prevent restrictions to access. In reality, most self-regulation
is supported by a statutory framework – for example, compulsion or licensure
powers – with some role for external actors (e.g. governments or statutory
bodies).
The extremes of the continuum of state involvement can be characterized by
two ideal types: the guild approach and the bureaucratic state approach.
The guild approach
This approach was foreshadowed in the guilds of the Middle Ages, organizations
that possessed quasi-governmental authority to regulate their membership,
using their monopoly power to decide who could practise, their prices and min-
imum quality standards (Hollings and Pike-Nase 1997). Although the guilds’
authority diminished with the rise of the nation state, national medical societies,
established in many countries between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries,
continued to reflect the medieval structures and in many respects still do so
today.
Professional associations operate as primary regulatory institutions, benefit-
ing from a triple monopoly: economic (control of recruitment, training and
credentialing, protected contractual positions); political (control of the area of
expertise, provision of expert guidance for legislators and administrators); and
administrative (control of standards of practice, discipline) (Freidson 1994).
Their activity emphasizes approaches that regulate new entrants rather than
control those already in practice, as reflected in the low number of disciplinary
actions in comparison with estimates of the incidence of incompetent practice
(Institute of Medicine 1989).
Turf monitoring and turf protection occupy much of the regulatory bodies’
energy as the various occupations battle among themselves about which parts
of health care fall under their jurisdiction. Historically, professional associ-
ations sought to defend their practitioners’ interests against irregular healers
(Lindemann 1999); today, changes in professional boundaries are viewed as
expansions, encroachments and infringements. Such fragmented, competitive
and adversarial regulatory activity, based on exclusive occupational domains, is
reflected in a high level of compartmentalization of health occupations that
leaves little room for collaborative practice.
The bureaucratic state approach
The bureaucratic state approach dates back to the Enlightenment period of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as nation states sought to reduce
the powers and privileges of the guilds. This process accelerated in the aftermath
of the French Revolution, as most European nations abolished those institu-
tions that were seen as antipathetic to the ideals of egalitarianism and popular
sovereignty (Burrage 1990; Bellis 2000).
During the second half of the twentieth century, with the expansion of the
welfare state in both western and eastern Europe, this model of regulation
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became more commonplace. The steady expansion of bureaucracy is seen as
undermining professional sources of power, contributing to the bureaucratiza-
tion of medicine and proletarianization of health practitioners (Braverman
1974; Larson 1977; Derber 1982). From this bureaucratic state approach, the
case for state intervention is set within a welfare maximization framework. The
state can legitimately exercise its power as part of its duty to protect the interests
of the public as opposed to those of professional elites (Moran 1995). The
government takes ultimate responsibility for care delivery and even clinical
standards. Bureaucratic mechanisms are used by the state to exert administrative
control over professional bodies and even individual practitioners.
Types of regulation
The other main decision for policy-makers is how to regulate. In particular, at
what level should regulation be implemented and what tools should be used? The
type of regulation can be understood as a continuum from the macro- through
the meso- to the micro-level (Figure 10.2).
At one end of the spectrum there are macro forms of regulation. These shape
the market for services and the characteristics and conduct of participants
(Table 10.1). Regulation of this sort may influence the supply of health workers,
control wages and prices, establish levels of services, harmonize qualifications
and requirements or set and enforce common standards for practice. Macro-
regulation tends to rely on hierarchy (bureaucratic or professional) and a variety
of centralized state-run and professional agencies for its implementation. Usually
negotiation is centralized (involving the state and organized representatives)
and collective decisions are applied to all workers within a defined geographical
area (e.g. country, state or region). Regulations are both prescriptive and compre-
hensive; that is, providing a detailed definition of scope, conditions of practice
and codes of conduct under which professionals can be held accountable.
At the other end of the spectrum, micro-regulation focuses on the delivery of
services and their outcomes. Regulatory influences are exerted primarily
through devolved institutions or independent agencies such as insurance
funds, consumer organizations or audit agencies. Instruments such as quality-
based contracting are used to create incentives for practitioners to improve their
Figure 10.2 Types of regulation.
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performance and adopt the most cost-effective and evidence-based practices.
Other interventions, such as continuous quality improvement, risk manage-
ment, benchmarking, quality circles and standardized treatment procedures, are
used within organizations to influence the practices of individual health workers.
In line with the ideas of NPM (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Bekke et al. 1996), this
approach allows a certain degree of flexibility to tailor the regulations to the
circumstances of each organization or group. Often micro-regulation is associ-
ated with deregulation and an easing of the degree of prescription imposed by
regulations; however, it may instead reflect in practice a process of re-regulation
with an increased sophistication of regulatory mechanisms.
The next part of this chapter examines the reforms to professional regulation
in Norway, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, highlighting the trends
moving away from the traditional approaches set out above or changes in the
types of regulation employed.
New modes of regulation of the health labour force in Europe
Within Europe, many countries have introduced reforms to the regulatory
environment as it applies to the health workforce. Regulation has proved a
highly versatile tool. It has been wielded to: influence the supply of health
workers; monitor the process of production; facilitate mobility; stimulate
changes in practices; increase responsiveness to consumer needs and expect-
ations; and create incentives for improved performance and higher standards
of service. Drawing on empirical data generated from five European case studies
prepared for this book, this section explores the extent to which these reforms
and concurrent changes in the wider health system have impacted on traditional
modes of regulation.
Table 10.1 Summary of macro- versus micro-regulation
Macro-regulation Micro-regulation
Purpose Control of market structure,
characteristics and conduct of
participants
Management of delivery of
services and outcome
Areas of action Inputs and prices Outputs and outcomes
Instruments Numerus clausus League tables
Fee schedule Quality-based contracting
Minimum qualifications Continuous quality improvement
Standards of practice Risk management
Benchmarking, quality circles and
standardized treatment
procedures
Nature and scope Prescriptive and comprehensive Flexible and tailored
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The medical profession in Norway: state capture or
cooptive polity?
Governance of the Norwegian health care system and of its workers has been
shaped by traditional Nordic decision-making practices. Interest groups, organ-
ized around functional sectors, are granted privileges of self-governance but are
integrated closely with the state and strongly involved in the process of formu-
lating and implementing health policy (Blom-Hansen 2000; Peters 2000). In
this context, the Norwegian medical profession has been able to take advantage
of its institutional integration into the state machinery to dominate health care
policy and safeguard its self-regulation privileges (Erichsen 1995). Physicians
obtained hegemonic positions in shaping health care through their right of
veto over policy changes, dominance of formal decision-making arenas and
positions in many critical posts in the health bureaucracy.
Even now, the medical profession maintains authority over the context and
content of its work and, to a certain extent, health policy-making as a whole.
While a substantial part of state authority has been devolved to independent
regulatory agencies as part of the structural devolution that took place during
the 1990s (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a, b), physicians have remained dom-
inant in the new health care supervisory agencies. For example, at national level
the Norwegian Board of Health, an independent technical agency with lead
responsibility for the supervision of health services, is heavily dominated by
physicians and works in collaboration with 19 county medical officers. At local
level, physicians are given primary responsibility for supervising health services
and monitoring counties’ and municipalities’ compliance with national health
policy (Feruholmen and Magnussen 2000).
However, recent reforms indicate that the medical profession’s efforts to
capture the power of the state, so as to maintain its influence over health policy-
making, are increasingly counterbalanced by the Norwegian state’s concurrent
attempts to increase its influence over medical activity through cooptation of
the professional elites.
Current developments suggest an active process of reshaping what has been
called the ‘professional state’, creating a new balance of power between the
medical profession and the state. Following recent changes in the institutional
context, the medical profession has developed a more detached relationship
with the state, as reflected in the Norwegian Medical Association’s restricted
participation in formal policy-making bodies and a reduction in physicians’
power of veto. Other examples include recent initiatives involving decentraliza-
tion and internal market experiments that have created new forms of external
influence over medical activity and have coopted professional elites into state
structures that control and regulate their peers on behalf of governments at
both national and local levels.
Since 1984, municipal councils have been responsible for financing and
providing primary health care. By 2001, most GPs (74%) were operating as
contractors directly accountable to municipal offices (van den Noord et al.
1998). Consequently, the Norwegian strategy to enhance the quality of health
care envisages a leading role for the political and administrative leaders of coun-
ties and municipalities (Norwegian Board of Health 2002). In addition, the
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Norwegian Directorate for Health and Social Affairs and the Norwegian Centre
for Health Technology Assessment (SMM) are developing medical guidelines,
quality indicators, medical databases, strategic planning and performance-
related budgeting tools; all formal instruments that are designed to reinforce
political control over health care professionals.
Thus, although regulation of the Norwegian medical profession still reflects
some key features of traditional Scandinavian corporatism, it appears that a
reshaping of the corporate order is under way, creating new opportunities for
public authorities to oversee professional activity, enforce improvement in
quality standards and, more broadly, increase the state’s influence over the
health policy process.
The case of la médecine libérale in France: self-regulation or
a lost legacy?
Despite the long-standing tradition of central state control that characterizes
French polity, the French health care system is viewed as one of the most liberal
in the world in terms of the autonomy enjoyed by patients and health profes-
sionals, particularly physicians (Poullier and Sandier 2000). Under the French
model of liberal medicine secured by the Charte médicale of 1927, private prac-
tice is dominant in ambulatory care and private practitioners are free to set up
practice wherever they choose. Doctors’ prescriptions are neither monitored nor
constrained. Professional status is based primarily on reputation. Physicians are
granted considerable autonomy over the content of their work. There is a strong
emphasis on professional confidentiality so that physicians are considered to be
answerable primarily to their patients and themselves for the quality of their
services (Rodwin 1981).
Implicit in this model is the view that self-governance is the preferred regula-
tory approach and that professional institutions should retain control over key
aspects of health care work. Consequently, professional bodies have retained
mandates for monitoring the performance and disciplining their members.
Efforts to restrict the choice of patients and providers have been strongly and, to
a certain extent, successfully resisted. One example is the recent failure to estab-
lish GPs as gatekeepers to secondary care (fewer than 1% of doctors signed up
to the scheme). However, a closer look at the evolution of the regulation of
health professions in France over recent decades suggests a dilution of the legacy
of liberal medicine because of significant developments.
First, the French state has been able to tighten its grip over the activity of the
health professions through the development of various forms of control and
regulation operating at the macro level (Wilsford 1987). Since 1971, the French
state has had direct control over the supply of health personnel through a
numerus clausus. Through control of education funding, the government has
the ability to create national training schemes for the health professions, estab-
lish quality norms for educational institutions and influence the location of
training and the distribution of specialists in each specialty and region.
Another source of state control comes from contractual agreements between
professional trade unions and the government. These agreements, initiated after
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the Second World War, define the financial resources available for health care
and the maximum fees that physicians may be reimbursed by the sickness funds
(Maria and Ostrowski 2003). Since the 1996 Juppé reforms, the French Parliament
has held the ultimate responsibility for determining the rate of increase in
health care expenditures and setting annual targets for the growth of private
practice medical fees and prescriptions.
Second, more recent efforts to improve the efficiency and quality of medical
services have targeted the heart of the liberal practice itself, sanctioning pre-
scribing practices and the behaviour of individual professionals at the micro
level. The 1996 Juppé Plan introduced provisions for both collective and
individual sanctions against overspending physicians. Similar objectives were
pursued through mandatory universal practice guidelines known as références
médicales opposables. These new tools explicitly sought to rationalize medical
practices, standardize patient care and limit the unnecessary prescription of
redundant and costly drugs, tests and procedures (Durand-Zaleski et al. 1997;
Durieux et al. 2000).
New state-controlled bodies have been given new responsibilities for evaluat-
ing professional practice and quality assessment. For instance, ANAES (a gov-
ernment agency with statutory authority) has been given a clear mandate to
establish the state of knowledge on diagnostic and therapeutic procedures,
issue guidelines for clinical practice and provide technical recommendations
to sickness funds. ANAES provides support and guidance to the 22 regional
associations of independent doctors founded in 1993 to contribute to the
improvement of health care quality and evaluate the practice of physicians.
The clinical practice of general practitioners is coming under increasing
scrutiny (Maria and Ostrowski 2003). This role has been devolved to counsellor
doctors (médecins-conseils) employed directly by the medical division of CNAMTS
(National Health Insurance Fund for Salaried Employees), who have the right of
access to all medical records and data held by local sickness funds. Although
access to patient information remains a sensitive issue, the consolidation of all
patient reimbursement claims in a single electronic database is proving to be an
invaluable tool that enables the counsellor doctors to scrutinize patterns of
clinical practice (Or 2002).
In summary, while the medical profession still holds tightly to the principles of
liberal medicine, the introduction of a number of new policy tools at both macro
and micro levels during successive reforms has extended the state’s power and
its capacity to exert control while eroding professional independence.
The reform of self-regulation in the United Kingdom:
professionally led regulation or managerial dominance?
In contrast to many continental European countries, professions in the United
Kingdom have historically developed independently of the state. In line with the
guild approach mentioned above, the state-sanctioned model of self-regulation
enshrined in the Medical Act of 1858 left the professions considerable authority
to set standards for training and practice, control entry to the profession and
monitor and enforce standards of practice (Irvine 1997). Responsibility for
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ensuring that doctors were performing effectively was the exclusive responsibil-
ity of the General Medical Council (GMC) and the Royal Colleges (DoH 1999)
until the 1990s.
However, the 1990s saw the emergence of more articulate consumerism in
health care, a widespread perception of substantial inefficiencies in the use of
health care resources and high-profile examples of clinical practice failures.
These created both political and professional momentum for reform of profes-
sional regulation (BRI Inquiry Secretariat 1999). In the wake of the Bristol and
Shipman cases (the former involving failure to act in response to high death
rates among babies undergoing cardiac surgery, the latter a general practitioner
convicted of murdering patients using overdoses of morphine), even the survival
of the GMC with its system of medical self-regulation was questioned, creating a
sense of urgency among medical profession leaders to tackle the perceived fail-
ures of self-regulation (CMO Review Group 1995; BMA et al. 1998; Klein 1998;
Stacey 2000). A model of professionally led regulation was proposed as an alter-
native to self-regulation. This still places a strong emphasis on professional
bodies’ role in setting standards and assuring competency.
New mechanisms are being introduced with the goal of ensuring better moni-
toring of professional activity. For example, the GMC is developing methods for
assessing the performance of allegedly poorly performing doctors (Southgate
and Dauphinee 1998) and has introduced a requirement that physicians disclose
evidence of inadequate medical practice. The introduction of revalidation for
medical practitioners requires all registered doctors to demonstrate periodically
that they are up-to-date and fit to practise in their chosen field (Catto 2003). In
addition, a number of professional bodies have recently changed their struc-
tures and composition, increasing the proportion of lay representatives in order
to integrate non-medical input into their decision-making process, making
them more transparent and more accountable to the public (Hatch 2001).
Concurrently with these professional initiatives, governance of the health
professions has become a highly politicized issue, prompting a wide range of
initiatives by successive governments since the late 1980s. The White Paper
Working for Patients (DoH 1989) introduced the internal market in the British
health system; it signalled a greater role for managers in assessing the quality of
health care services, a role previously reserved almost exclusively for clinicians.
Contracts, and thus the distribution of funds, gave managers potentially strong
levers to make professionals take account of specific purchaser or client
demands. To some extent, clinical autonomy became circumscribed within the
parameters of contracts, although in practice the inherent ambiguities of health
care meant that the more ambitious managerial expectations were never fulfilled
(McKee and Clarke 1995). More recently, The New NHS, Modern, Dependable,
published in 1997, warned that self-regulation could be sustainable only if it
became open to public scrutiny and responsive to changing service demands. To
support such changes, the Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Profes-
sionals (rebranded as the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence) has
been established in order to coordinate approaches across the various profes-
sional bodies and build a common framework that explicitly allows for robust
public scrutiny.
In addition to these various structural levers, clinical governance has given
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managers statutory responsibilities for the quality of health care delivered by
their organizations, together with the legitimacy and authority to monitor clin-
ical services at the micro level. There have been attempts to involve groups of
clinicians in management, so that managerial and fiscal discipline can be
imposed on clinicians through more subtle clinical–managerial channels (Ferlie
1999). NHS targets, waiting lists, guidelines and protocols have stood out as
valuable instruments to control clinical practice and have enabled managers to
nibble at the edge of clinical decision-making through micro-management.
Such developments have been underpinned by the creation of a number of new
national standards agencies, such as NICE and the Health Care Commission,
devoted to promoting the performance of health care providers and ensuring
quality.
Thus, the reform of professional regulation in the United Kingdom clearly
reflects a tension between professional efforts to perpetuate the patterns of self-
governance within new arrangements and government attempts to develop a
more actively managed, externally regulated system. While the government is
using the NHS’s strong structural levers and a series of new regulatory agencies
to constrain clinical autonomy and achieve its policy objectives, professional
elites are seeking actively to consolidate public confidence in self-regulation.
Restructuring German legal corporatism: new corporate order
or another version of self-governance?
Regulation of the health care workforce in Germany has traditionally reflected
the country’s dominant policy style of legal corporatism, with extensive cooper-
ation between governments and various associations granted official standing
by law (Offe 1981; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Dyson 1992; Aguilar 1993;
Dryzek et al. 2002). In this system of interest mediation, large organized interests
are granted formal sanction by the state and thus official status as legitimate
participants in the decision-making process. In exchange for this monopoly,
they commit to coordinate their actions and to contribute to the common pub-
lic interest through the cooperation of their members (Dyson 1980; Jepperson
2000). Above all, the state’s role is focused on providing a unified legal frame-
work (set out in Social Code Book V) (Busse and Reisberg 2000). Within this
broad framework, the corporatist actors benefit from significant constitutional
autonomy and authority both to regulate the behaviour of their members and
to shape the organization of health care (Altenstetter 1987; Burau 1999). In
many respects, a guild-like approach is evident in this system. Within the statu-
tory health insurance scheme, professional associations operate as the main
regulatory, administrative and financing bodies, acting as a buffer between
individual professionals and the statutory funds, shielding the funds from direct
surveillance of professional activity (Godt 1987; Busse and Reisberg 2000).
Responsibility for professional accreditation in ambulatory care is devolved to
the regional associations of ambulatory care physicians, who also negotiate
with sickness funds, private insurance companies and voluntary and public
agencies. Their monopolistic and cartel-promoting behaviour is reflected in the
sharp division between inpatient care and ambulatory care. Ambulatory care
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has remained a monopoly of the associations of ambulatory physicians and,
until 1993, hospitals (except university hospitals) were not allowed to provide
even ambulatory surgery.
Outside the scope of the statutory health insurance system, professional cham-
bers assume certain exclusive regulatory functions, notably in specialist training,
continuing education, licensing, access to professional practice, development
and enforcement of professional standards.
As in the United Kingdom, German professional bodies have been more pro-
active recently, taking steps to strengthen and modernize their self-regulatory
mechanisms (Birkner 1998). For example, since 1993 the National Association
of SHI-Accredited Physicians (physicians working in the ambulatory sector) has
launched new quality assurance projects, developed quality control charts and
promoted ‘quality circles’ (more than 1000 peer-based quality groups) (Gerlach
et al. 1998). The Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Förderung der Qualitätssicherung in Medizin
(Working Group for the Advancement of Quality Assurance in Medicine),
founded by the German Medical Association and the National Association of
SHI-Accredited Physicians, has been operating as a clearing house for standards
and practice guidelines.
This picture adds weight to the argument that the German health care system
relies heavily on traditional self-regulation to govern the functioning of its pro-
fessional elements and that many recent initiatives initiated by the professions
seek primarily to secure public confidence in the guild system. However, after
more than a century of strong professional autonomy, the German state has
re-emerged as a major actor in health policy-making (Hinrichs 1995; Burau
1999; Altenstetter 2001). A series of cost-containment measures, introduced
from the 1970s onwards, challenges the financial autonomy of doctors, their
freedom to prescribe and their control of key areas of health policy. Capping
mechanisms, such as a strict global prescribing budget and lump sum prospect-
ive budgets for sickness funds’ payments to physicians’ associations, were
introduced despite vociferous and coordinated opposition by physicians.
In the early 1990s, a requirement that any overspend in the new drug budgets
or in the global remuneration envelope be repaid by doctors was introduced
(Busse and Howorth 1999). As physicians’ associations became liable for over-
spending, they were forced to scrutinize more closely the practice profiles of
their members, measured by such criteria as the number of drugs prescribed,
office visits, laboratory tests per case and rates of certain surgical procedures. A
number of additional structural changes, including limitation of the number
and type of physicians who can practise in different regions of Germany, a
reduction in the number of medical students, rationalization of the very frag-
mented system of sickness funds and the introduction of elements of managed
competition, appear to confirm the prospect for further political and managerial
encroachment on professional power and autonomy.
Furthermore, while quality issues traditionally were the domain of individual
clinicians or professional organizations, actors external to the professional bod-
ies (such as the Federal Committee of Sickness Fund Physicians, a body where
doctors are in the minority) have been involved increasingly in the development
and enforcement of clinical guidelines, medical audit and quality assurance
(Busse and Reisberg 2000).
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In summary, professional regulation in Germany is shifting from a system of
self-governance towards one that secures a greater role for the state. The overall
picture suggests a drive towards a more technocratic model of regulation led by
external actors, and the use of more policy instruments by both professional
bodies and government, including new micro-management tools such as diag-
nosis related groups (DRGs), computerized practice profiles, clinical practice
guidelines and quality assurance systems.
Changing models of professional regulation
For more than a century, the self-regulation of professionals in health care has
provided a powerful tool, at least in western Europe, to guarantee minimum
standards of health care delivery, ensure appropriate levels of technical and
ethical practice and hold providers accountable when they slip below accepted
standards. Statutory self-regulation has required health professions to develop a
complex infrastructure that serves to keep professional services acceptable to
society. It has also granted the medical profession legitimacy for authoritative
advocacy on behalf of patients and autonomy to determine the clinical content
of their practice at micro level and the terms of their practice at macro level.
Over recent years, the traditional mechanisms of self-regulation have been
challenged by a number of well-publicized concerns about: clinical competence;
growing evidence of unexplained variations in medical practice; pressure groups’
increasing willingness to publicize information about sub-standard services;
evidence of poor outcomes despite increasing expenditures; and changing atti-
tudes within medicine itself. The evidence drawn from the case studies indicates
that regulatory reforms broadly are driving changes in two ways.
The growth of public accountability
Increased politicization of the health care decision-making process has resulted
in calls for closer public scrutiny of professional activities, the emergence of new
externalized forms of control and the development of new reporting lines –
upwards to governmental or independent regulatory agencies and downwards
to consumers and citizens. The guild approach, evident in the various forms of
corporatism in European health systems such as those of Germany and the
United Kingdom, has come under attack. Other social actors, not only govern-
ments but also managers, parliaments and the general public, have assumed
increased responsibility for overseeing professional activity and defining the
framework of self-regulation. Many initiatives from governments, payers and
consumers have focused on recasting the relationship with medicine in order to
reduce its tight grip on policy, overcome its resistance to outside scrutiny and
impose various forms of political and/or managerial control over medical care.
Professional elites coopted into state structures in Norway, medical associations
in Germany, counsellor doctors recruited by the sickness funds in France
and clinicians with managerial functions in the United Kingdom have been
used as channels for ensuring compliance with governmental and managerial
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requirements. In many cases, self-regulatory organizations have been prompted
to sacrifice voluntarily some aspects of their collective power in order to safeguard
control over the core content of their work.
The perceived regulatory failure of professionally dominated self-regulation,
as well as overly bureaucratic state regulation, has led to a growth in alternative
forms of public accountability, either through more diverse representation on
professional bodies (e.g. from other professions, consumer and patient groups
or the state) or through the state establishing quasi-independent public bodies
that are seen to be less bureaucratic. In all four countries examined, conventional
approaches are being displaced in favour of a concept of regulation that is more
pluralistic, drawing upon more diffuse sources of power and a greater diversity
in the basis of control. A wide range of formal, externalized regulatory controls
is used to ensure that health practitioners account for their performance to a
range of stakeholders, including consumers, government agents, citizens’ repre-
sentatives, professional bodies, auditors, purchasers of care and regional and
local health authorities.
The regional authorities in Norway, ANAES and the CNAMTS in France, the
Federal Committee of Sickness Fund Physicians in Germany and NICE in the
United Kingdom exemplify institutions that have been given prerogatives to
hold health professionals accountable for their practices. These add to efforts
developed in many recent reforms, particularly where there have been experi-
ments with internal markets, to provide consumers and purchasers with the
option to choose providers on the basis of their performance (Hibbard and Weeks
1989; Hannan et al. 1994; Edgman-Levitan and Cleary 1996; Lansky 1998;
Rosenthal et al. 1998; Schneider and Epstein 1998).
The criticisms of self-regulation have provoked responses from the professions
themselves. In the United Kingdom they have initiated reforms to offer reassur-
ance that self-regulation fits the modern context of health care delivery. Such
developments have suggested the emergence of a new guild, in which strategic
elites within the health professions are attempting to maintain professional
control over health care and forestall further managerial encroachment on pro-
fessional activity by being more proactive and taking initiatives to modernize
self-regulation (Tuohy 1976, 1988; Freidson 1994). Increasing lay representation
on professional bodies and the changing composition of governance structures,
as seen in the recent reforms of the GMC in the United Kingdom, are indicative
of this trend.
To a certain extent, all these developments have altered the relationship
between medicine and other health occupations such as nursing. Subordination
to medicine is being replaced by direct accountability to the public, the gov-
ernment and the legislatures, and by direct access to the policy-making process
(Chapter 4).
The shift from macro- to micro-regulation
Recent reforms of health care systems in Europe have shown a clear trend
towards new regimes of regulation characterized by an increased emphasis on
micro-efficiency and the application of a range of technical tools. The traditional
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regulatory tools, favoured by both the bureaucratic state and professional bodies,
which have featured mostly a concern for macro-managerial control, are being
supplemented with a new generation of policy instruments: références médicales
opposables in France, quality indicators in Norway, performance indicators in
the United Kingdom and practice profiles in Germany.
The formalization and codification of performance standards is a key feature
of recent regulatory reforms in the United Kingdom, reflected in the increasing
use of business plans, contracts for service delivery and performance indicators
and targets. Measures that target costs are complemented by micro-measures
that affect clinical practice more directly in France and Germany. In all the
countries examined there is an emphasis on the provision of information in the
form of league tables, consumer reports, score cards, public performance
reports, provider/practice profiles, billing patterns, utilization reviews and qual-
ity monitoring systems. These are used to: enforce individual practitioners’
compliance with specific performance standards; monitor clinical services; foster
provider organizations’ and individual practitioners’ accountability for their
performance; and ensure that all stakeholders have adequate access to informa-
tion on providers’ performance. Such developments have been fostered by a
number of technological developments, such as computerized databases, elec-
tronic systems for reimbursement and smart cards, all of which make it possible
to scrutinize professional practice more closely.
The professions have been involved in this process and have sought actively
to initiate innovative measures aimed at rationalizing and modernizing self-
regulation. Guidelines, protocols, case mix measures, techniques of evidence-
based medicine and other actions to systematize professional practice are
promoted as tools that the professions can develop to ensure higher standards
of care and protect patients from the consequences of poor practice. Medical
audit and other forms of peer review, the development of measurable and
auditable outcome indicators, often published as league tables or report cards
(Marshall et al. 2003), and scrutiny of professional practice are introduced in
order to facilitate early detection and correction of inappropriate care.
Reflecting a move from a reactive regime to a more proactive environment,
continuing professional development and competence monitoring are pro-
moted as ways to ensure that professionals regularly demonstrate evidence of
their competence. This approach seeks to empower regulatory bodies not only
to deal with a few high-profile cases where performance is clearly unacceptable,
but also to reduce the tail of underperforming practitioners. Within this model,
a significant element of professional control is exerted through local systems of
monitoring but within a national framework of self-regulation. Local peers
become the primary scrutinizers of professional practice (Sheaff et al. 2004).
Although these professionally led measures have been incremental in nature,
seeking jealously to safeguard many of the privileges of self-regulation, they
have reflected a trend that is similar to the development of technical control
mechanisms.
Thus, the evidence seems to suggest a dual process. First, the source of author-
ity for control is shifting from traditional bureaucratic mechanisms and profes-
sional bodies towards a broader range of regulatory agencies, which operate at
all levels of the health system and aim to enlarge health care workers’ scope
Reshaping the regulation of the workforce in European health care systems 187
of accountability. Second, there is the emergence of new policy instruments
that operate mostly at micro level, introduced by both professional and
governmental agencies to optimize the control of professional activity.
Conclusion
Over recent decades developments in public administration, in both theory and
practice, have challenged the two traditional ideal types of regulation: the guild
and the state bureaucratic approaches. New models of regulation are emerging.
No longer able to rely on their traditional privileged and trusted status, increas-
ingly professionals have had to find rational and instrumental means to secure
their position and ensure the continuation of the present balance of responsi-
bilities for accountability, regulation and the management of professional activ-
ities. The principles of new public management, such as decentralization and
consumer involvement, have had an important influence on government activ-
ity in many sectors and altered the respective roles of government and public
service providers. Such trends are also apparent within regulatory structures,
with greater diversification of regulatory bodies and delegation of regulatory
authority. Changes can also be seen with the growth of lay involvement.
Despite self-regulation’s failure to ensure public protection, no reform has
attempted to replace it entirely with alternative regulatory forms. The aim of
the reforms has instead been to consolidate, complement or renew the prevail-
ing professional and bureaucratic mechanisms. Despite the powerful rhetoric in
favour of deregulation, more often the reality has been expansion of the regula-
tory system through the adoption of new instruments, development of new
channels of control and creation of new regulatory agencies, rather than a
removal of professional regulatory authority.
Although these trends in regulatory reforms show some consistency between
countries, not all countries are at the same stage of recasting their regulatory
system. The post-communist countries of CEE are still at an early phase in
rebuilding their professional institutions. Similarly, the pace of reform, the
choice of regulatory tools and how they are implemented are constrained by
the unique institutional history and the distinct corporate structure of each
country.
Notes
1 Within the scope of this chapter it is not possible to consider the regulation of all
health professionals, such as dentists, nurses, pharmacists, allied health professionals
or indeed some of the so-called complementary and alternative medical practitioners.
Given the historical precedence of professional regulation for doctors, it is likely that
many of the trends identified will apply to other health professionals in due course.
2 Regulatory instruments are defined here as procedural and substantive forms of pub-
lic action that are used to influence the behaviour and functioning of health care
personnel or to modify the production of health services (see Eliadis and Hill 2001).
188 Human resources for health in Europe
References
Aguilar, S. (1993) Corporatist and statist regimes in environmental policy: Germany and
Spain. Environmental Politics, 2: 223–47.
Altenstetter, C. (1987) An end to a consensus on health care in the Federal Republic of
Germany? Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 12(3): 505–36.
Altenstetter, C. (2001) Health care reform in Germany in comparative perspective, with
special attention to funding and reimbursement issues of medical and hospital ser-
vices. Paper prepared for delivery at the 29th ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops,
Grenoble, France, 6–11 April.
Baldwin, R. and Cave, M. (1999) Understanding regulation: theory, strategy and practice.
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Becker, G.S. (1983) A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98: 371–400.
Bekke, H., Perry, J. and Toonen, T. (1996) Civil service systems in comparative perspective.
Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
Bellis, C. (2000) Professions in society. Australian Actuarial Journal, 6(1): 1–33.
Birkner, B.R. (1998) Country report. National quality of care activities in Germany.
International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 10: 451–4.
Blom-Hansen, J. (2000) Still corporatism in Scandinavia? A survey of recent empirical
finding. Scandinavian Political Studies, 23(2): 157–81.
Braverman, H. (1974) Labor and monopoly capital: the degradation of work in the twentieth
century. New York, Monthly Review Press.
BRI Inquiry Secretariat (1999) BRI inquiry paper on commissioning, purchasing, contracting
and quality of care in the NHS internal market. London, BRI Inquiry Secretariat.
British Medical Association, Academy of Medical Royal Colleges and Joint Consultants
Committee (1998) Making self-regulation work at the local level. London, BMA.
Burau, V. (1999) Health care reform and the medical profession – the case of Germany.
Paper presented at the 27th ECPR Joint Sessions in Mannheim, 26–31 March.
Burrage, M. (1990) Beyond a subset: the professional aspirations of manual workers
in France, the United States and Britain. In: Burrage, M. and Torhstendahl, R., eds,
Professions in theory and history. London, Sage.
Busse, R. and Howorth, C. (1999) Cost containment in Germany: twenty years’ experi-
ence. In: Le Grand, M.E. and Le Grand, J., eds, Health care and cost containment in the
European Union. Aldershot, Ashgate.
Busse, R. and Reisberg, A. (2000) Health care systems in transition: Germany. Copenhagen,
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
Catto, G. (2003) Improving professional competence – the way ahead? International Journal
of Quality Health Care, 15: 375–6.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2001a) New public management: the transformation of ideas
and practice. Aldershot, Ashgate.
Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2001b) Coping with modern leadership roles – the prob-
lematic redefinition of public companies. Paper presented at the 2001 Meeting of the
IPSA Section of the Structure of Governance, 29–31 March, University of Oklahoma,
Norman.
CMO Review Group (1995) Maintaining medical excellence. London, Department of
Health.
Coase, R.H. (1974) The choice of the institutional framework: a comment. Journal of Law
and Economics, 17(2): 493–6.
Department of Health (1989) Working for patients. London, HMSO.
Department of Health (1997) The new NHS, modern, dependable. London, The Stationery
Office.
Reshaping the regulation of the workforce in European health care systems 189
Department of Health (1999) Supporting doctors, protecting patients. London: Department of
Health (www.doh.gov.uk/cmoconsult.htm).
Derber, C. (1982) Towards a new theory of professionals as workers: advanced capitalism
and post-industrial labor. In: Derber, C., ed., Professionals as workers: mental labor in
advanced capitalism. Boston, G. K. Hail.
Dryzek, J.S. et al. (2002) Environmental transformation of the state: the USA, Norway,
Germany and the UK. Political Studies, 50(4): 659–82.
Durand-Zaleski, I., Colin, C. and Blum-Boisgard, C. (1997) An attempt to save money
by using mandatory practice guidelines in France. British Medical Journal, 315:
943–6.
Durieux, P. et al. (2000) From clinical recommendations to mandatory practice: the intro-
duction of regulatory practice guidelines in the French health care system. International
Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, 16(4): 969–75.
Dyson, K. (1980) The state tradition in western Europe: a study of an idea and institution.
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Dyson, K. (1992) The politics of German regulation. Aldershot, Dartmouth.
Edgman-Levitan, S. and Cleary, P.D. (1996) What information do consumers want and
need? Health Affairs, 15: 42–56.
Eliadis, F.P. and Hill, M. (2001) Instrument choice in global democracies. Concept paper.
Ottawa, Policy Research Initiative.
Erichsen, V. (1995) Health care reform in Norway: the end of the profession state? Journal
of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20: 719–37.
Ferlie, E. (1999) Organisation and management: archetype change in the organisation and
management of health care? In: Dargie, C., ed., Policy futures for UK health: technical
series. London, Nuffield Trust.
Feruholmen, C. and Magnussen, J. (2000) Health care systems in transition: Norway.
Copenhagen, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
Freidson, E. (1970) Profession of medicine: a study of the sociology of applied knowledge.
New York, Harper and Row.
Freidson, E. (1994) Professionalism reborn: theory, prophecy and policy. Chicago, University of
Chicago Press.
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and freedom. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Gellhorn, W. (1956) Individual freedom and governmental restraints. Baton Rouge, Louisiana
State University Press.
Gellhorn, W. (1976) The abuse of occupational licensing. University of Chicago Law Review,
44: 6–27.
Gerlach, F.M., Beyer, M. and Römer, A. (1998) Quality circles in ambulatory care: state of
development and future perspective in Germany. International Journal for Quality in
Health Care, 10: 35–42.
Godt, P.J. (1987) Confrontation, consent and corporatism: state strategies and the medical
profession in France, Great Britain and West Germany. Journal of Health Politics, Policy
and Law, 12(3): 459–80.
Hannan, E.L. et al. (1994) Improving the outcomes of coronary artery bypass surgery in
New York State. Journal of the American Medical Association, 271: 761–6.
Hatch, D. (2001) Professionally led regulation in medicine. British Journal of Ophthalmology,
85(5): 513–15.
Hibbard, J.H. and Weeks, E.C. (1989) Does the dissemination of comparative data on
physician fees affect consumer use of services? Medical Care, 27: 1167–74.
Hinrichs, K. (1995) The impact of German health insurance reforms on redistribution and
the culture of solidarity. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 20(3): 653–87.
Hogan, D. (1979) The regulation of psychotherapists. Volume I: A study in the philosophy and
practice of professional regulation. Cambridge, MA, Ballinger.
190 Human resources for health in Europe
Hollings, R.L. and Pike-Nase, C. (1997) Professional and occupational licensure in the United
States. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press.
Institute of Medicine (1989) Allied health services: avoiding crises. Washington, DC,
National Academy Press.
Irvine, D. (1997) The performance of doctors: professionalism and self-regulation in a
changing world. British Medical Journal, 314: 1540–2.
Jacob, J.M. (1999) Doctors and rules: a sociology of professional values, 2nd edn. London,
Transaction Publishers.
Jepperson, R.L. (2000) Institutional logics: on the constitutive dimensions of the modern
nation-state polities. Florence, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European
University Institute.
Klein, R. (1998) Competence, professional self-regulation and public interest. British
Medical Journal, 316: 1740–2.
Lansky, D. (1998) Measuring what matters to the public. Health Affairs, 17: 40–1.
Larson, M.S. (1977) The rise of professionalism. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Lehmbruch, G. and Schmitter, P. (1982) Patterns of corporatist policy-making. London, Sage.
Lindemann, M. (1999) Medicine and society in early modern Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Lowenberg, A.D. and Tinnin, T.D. (1992) Professional versus consumer interests in
regulation: the case of the US child care industry. Applied Economics, 24: 571–80.
McKee, C.M. and Clarke, A. (1995) Guidelines, enthusiasms, uncertainty and the limits to
purchasing. British Medical Journal, 310: 101–4.
Maria, S. and Ostrowski, T. (2003) The organisation, financing and quality monitoring in
general practice: a comparative study between England, France and Poland. EUROPHAMILI
/AESCULAPIUS professional study. Nottingham, University of Nottingham.
Marshall, M.N. et al. (2003) Public reporting on quality in the United States and the
United Kingdom. Health Affairs (Millwood), 22(3): 134–48.
Merry, M.D. and Crago, M.G. (2001) The past, present and future of health care quality:
urgent need for innovative, external review processes to protect patients. Physician
Executive, 27(5): 30–5.
Moore, T.G. (1961) A theory of professional licensing. Journal of Law and Economics, 4:
93–117.
Moran, M. (1995) Explaining change in the NHS: corporatism, closure and democratic
capitalism. Public Policy and Administration, 10(2): 21–33.
Moran, M. and Wood, B. (1993) States, regulation and the medical profession. Buckingham,
Open University Press.
Norwegian Board of Health (2002) Quality in health care: the role of government in supervision
and monitoring in Norway. Oslo, Norwegian Board of Health.
Offe, C. (1981) The attribution of public status to interest groups: observations on the
West German case. In: Berger, S., ed., Organizing interests in western Europe. Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press.
Or, Z. (2002) Improving the performance of health care systems: from measures to action (A
review of experiences in four OECD countries). Paris, OECD.
Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) Reinventing government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is
transforming the public sector. New York, Addison-Wesley.
Peltzman, S. (1989) The economic theory of regulation after a decade of deregulation.
Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, 1–41.
Peters, G. (2000) Administrative traditions. In: TWB Group, eds, Administrative and
civil service reform (www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/traditions.htm),
accessed April 2004.
Posner, R. (1974) Theories of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics, 5:
335–58.
Reshaping the regulation of the workforce in European health care systems 191
Poullier, J.-P. and Sandier, S. (2000) France. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 25(5):
899–905.
Rodwin, V.G. (1981) The marriage of national health insurance and la medecine libérale
in France: a costly union. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly: Health and Society, 59(1):
16–43.
Rosenthal, G.E. et al. (1998) Using hospital performance data in quality improvement: the
Cleveland health quality choice experience. Joint Commission Journal on Quality
Improvement, 24: 347–60.
Rottenberg, S. (1980) Introduction. In: Rottenberg, S., ed., Occupational licensure and
regulation. Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
Saltman, R.B., Busse, R. and Mossialos, E. (2002) Regulating entrepreneurial behaviour in
European health care systems. Buckingham, Open University Press.
Schneider, E.C. and Epstein, A.M. (1998) Use of public performance reports: a survey of
patients undergoing cardiac surgery. Journal of the American Medical Association, 279:
1638–42.
Sheaff, R. et al. (2004) Governmentality by network in English primary health care. Social
Policy and Administration, 38(1): 89–103.
Smith, A. (1970) The wealth of nations, Books I–III (first published 1776). Harmondsworth,
Pelican.
Southgate, L. and Dauphinee, D. (1998) Continuing medical education, maintaining
standards in British and Canadian medicine: the developing role of the regulatory
body. British Medical Journal, 316: 697–700.
Stacey, M. (2000) The General Medical Council and professional self-regulation. In:
Gladstone, D., ed., Regulating doctors. London, Institute for the Study of Civil Society,
St Edmundsbury Press.
Stigler, G.J. (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics, 2: 3–21.
Tuohy, C. (1976) Medical politics after Medicare: the Ontario case. Canadian Public Policy,
2(2): 192–210.
Tuohy, C. (1988) Medicine and the state in Canada: the extra-billing issue in perspective.
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 21(2): 267–96.
Van den Noord, P., Hagen, T. and Iversen, T. (1998) The Norwegian health care system. Paris,
OECD.
Wilsford, D. (1987) The cohesion and fragmentation of organized medicine in France and
the United States. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 12(3): 481–503.
Zhou, X. (1993) Occupational power, state capacities and the diffusion of licensing in the
American states: 1890 to 1950. American Sociological Review, 58: 536–52.
192 Human resources for health in Europe
